Abstract: In In re Walt
INTRODUCTION
appeared during the trial and after the decision was delivered. 5 For the lawyer, the case is most interesting because it continues an illustrious history of cases that have had longterm impact for other than their ultimate legal holding. This case may set the form for later judicial decisions involving directors and top management's duty of care.
Some cases are continuously cited for their inspiring language, for example, Justice
Cardozo's statement about the moral level of fiduciaries as compared to actors in the market. 6 Some cases are unique for their strategic decision, for example, the Marbury v.
Madison decision of the Supreme Court 7 that avoided President Jefferson's refusal to enforce it, and yet maintained a positive outcome. That is because the decision did not require enforcement. That decision demonstrates a court's strategy to establish its power as against the President by producing an influential judgment that the President did not have to enforce, and therefore did not have the opportunity to deny enforcement. A number of features in the Disney case produce such extra-legal effects, which may be long-term. It is a classic example, and a somewhat novel one, of how a court of law can make law without making law by relegating the final judgment to the Court of Public Opinion.
Chancellor Chandler established the facts of the case and footnoted the sources much like a treatise or a casebook. Also, like a casebook or like the American Law Institute, the Chancellor recounted the general principles of the law. 8 The Delaware courts to his opinions. The Chancellor used strong words, close to disrespectful language, to describe the defendants' behavior, and damned the defendant Michael Ovitz's behavior by faint, and sometimes amazingly perplexing, praise.
The decision cast a shadow on, and perhaps reversed in part Justice Cardozo's view of fiduciary and market morals. While Justice Cardozo viewed the morals of the market place to be lower than the morals involved in the legal duties of fiduciaries, the Chancellor implied that "corporate best practices" (that is, the morals of the market place) may reach a higher level than the legal duties of care involved in such practices. Yet, in both cases, the nature of the behavior was not entirely clear. Both could be characterized as a breach of the duty of care or a violation of the duty of loyalty.
Most importantly, the Chancellor delved into the moral and business judgment of the defendants, and in fact, seems to have addressed the defendants through the media. The
Delaware court left the final judgment in similar cases to the Court of Public Opinion.
The court, however, was not passive. It also facilitated the ability of the Court of Public Opinion to reach a decision by providing it with facts that were verified under oath, and by adding to these facts the non-binding opinion of the judge. It is as if the court relegated the ultimate decision to the market, saying almost aloud: "In cases such as this one, let you, The Court of Public Opinion --the market, with the help of the media --decide!" Each of these features invites explanations. My explanations are speculative, since I have not spoken to the Chancellor. I offer them as possible and plausible, in the belief that they are very probable. Public Opinion in such cases as the Disney case is a better way to manage corporate governance. This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the approach and concludes that the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages. This Part discusses the possibilities that the Court of Public Opinion will be a flawed decision-maker; that although management's behavior may be seriously flawed, it would not have the drawing interest that other cases, such as Disney, do; or that the media becomes an unfair prosecutor of management. This Part of the article also discusses the question of whether it is fair for judges to berate parties and witnesses I obiter dicta and the protection of judges who do that. I conclude that notwithstanding these possibilities the approach of the Disney Court is justified.
ONE. FACTS, LAW AND RHETORICS
Unlike most cases, the Disney decision lays-out and footnotes not only fact finding but also the precise testimonies and the transcript places in which these testimonies can be found. The Chancellor explained his motive for using his extensive authorities' substantiation: He tabulated these facts to help the Appeals Court. This explanation makes sense, although the form in which the Chancellor offered the materials is unusual.
Therefore, additional explanations may lurk in the background. First, whatever findings the court makes, and whatever cites it offers, anyone who cites the facts is not exposed to the risk of defamation or libel claims by the persons or organizations that are subjects of these finding. 9 Defamation is worrisome to many authors of books that describe cases such as Disney. The decision constitutes an invitation to book and article writers. Second, the Court's materials are not sheltered by copyright. 10 They can be freely copied by anyone who would care to do so. Any writer about the characters and the stories in this case need not worry about defamation or copyright. That is quite a relief. 
The Establishment and Citation of the Law
Many Chancellors recite the law and cite cases on which they base their decisions. Many
Chancellors recite statutes, rules and the judicial precedents to be interpreted and followed. This approach is not unique. In fact, it is the norm. Precedents and authorities strengthen the decision.
However, in the Disney case the layout of the legal terrain is broader than the point on which the decision is to be based. It is far more an overall view and review of the duty of 24 Id. . . . Marchese runs all of these corporations . . . out of the same, single office, with the same phone line, the same expense accounts, and the like. And how he does "run" the expense accounts! . . . Marchese has used the bank accounts of these corporations to pay . . . personal expenses, including alimony and child support payments to his ex-wife, education expenses for his children, maintenance of his personal automobiles, health care for his pet --the list goes on and on. Marchese did not even have a personal bank account! With "corporate" accounts such as these, who needs a personal one?" hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices, any more than a common-law court deciding a medical malpractice dispute can impose a standard of liability based on ideal --rather than competent or standard-medical treatment practices, lest the average medical practitioner be found inevitably derelict.
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[A] reasonably prudent CEO (that is to say, a reasonably prudent CEO with a board willing to think for itself and assert itself against the CEO when necessary) would not have acted in as unilateral a manner as did Eisner when essentially committing the corporation to hire a second-incommand, appoint that person to the board, and provide him with one of the largest and richest employment contracts ever enjoyed by a non-CEO.
I write, "essentially committing," because although I conclude that legally, Ovitz's hiring was not a "done deal" as of the August 14 OLA, it was clear to Eisner, Ovitz, and the directors who were informed, that as a practical matter, it certainly was a "done deal." If that is so, however, it is unclear why Eisner was so eager and persistent in trying to get rid of Ovitz against his wishes quickly and ruthlessly, as the Chancellor so well documents. Would not Ovitz then become an enemy and supporter of a competitor?
Would $130 or more million change him from a fierce supporter of competitors to less fierce?
The reaction of news readers depends on the culture of their society. As Mark Roe has noted, Americans do not easily reach the level of "rage" at executive compensation. 45 It is curiosity that would draw readers more than anger. This case, however, unveils some of the behind-the-scene corporate management behavior and invites other sources of information to follow suit. Not "prospectus transparency" but "story transparency" may be powerful. This story is what investors would read. This information perhaps will invite them to make their judgment and induce them to act.
Law and the Ideal Corporate Practice
What did the Chancellor achieve by this judgment form? At the outset the Chancellor notes that the law is not as broad (or as demanding) as "ideal corporate governance."
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The word "ideal" seems to suggest that the market "best practices" of corporate governance represent a higher standard than the legal standard. The "ideal" to which management should aspire is hovering far above the law. This is an interesting approach since many would have assumed that best practices in the market place follow the law rather than lead law and leaves it behind. 43 Id. at 760-63. 44 Id. at 702. 45 One possible result of this emphasis on "ideal" best practices is that the practices will become less "idealistic" and will follow the letter of the law. This directive would therefore meet the demands and wishes of corporate management. In sum, the Disney decision can be viewed as a political masterpiece.
(1) It pleases management because it sets a standard that is admittedly lower than the market "best practices" standard.
(2) It discloses and documents aspects of internal management, including the personalities and behavior of the actors. Thus, it invites criticisms of management, rightly or wrongly. The decision invites public opinion and the media to supervise management and intrude on its business judgment while allowing the courts to establish the facts and even offer its opinion without the threat of being overruled by higher courts or the legislature. against management (if demand is not required in the shareholders' derivative suits) and yet retains Delaware's corporate business and holding on to its management clients (because the management is not found liable in such cases).
THREE. SIGNALS TO DEFENDANTS AND THE ADDRESS TO THE MEDIA
The question is whether this is a better way to manage and control corporate governance. I believe it is, for the following reasons.
First, I note that the Court of Public Opinion has been active for years in the area of public, political, and moral affairs. 49 It has also emerged strong in the area of securities acts violations 50 reporters. In some states this method was illegal and the justice department entered the scene. 58 In light of continued media coverage the face-saving exit of the CEO -by remaining a member of the board -was not sustained. She had to resign and leave within a few days. Ovitz opened his own firm again. He did not take positions in other corporations. Perhaps neither Ovitz nor Eisner wanted to become employee again.
Perhaps they were not invited. In both cases and without announcing disqualification, it has become far effective through the media. Debates concerning top management's decisions (whether management has conflicts of interest or not), such as the decision of whether to fight a hostile takeover, are fought not only in the Courts of Law but also in the Court of Public Opinion. 59 In such cases it may be better for the markets rather than government to decide what is right. The media will lead to the Court of Public Opinion.
Fifth, reporters have strong incentives to discover "scoops." Their "snooping" is more sheltered than the fishing for information by police and government investigators. At the same time the supervisors and editors of the newspaper have a strong incentive to ensure the accuracy of the publication. "The New York Times reporter Jayson Blair resigned after the newspaper discovered that he had copied articles from other newspapers and made outright fabrications in others. 60 In August 1998, the Boston Globe suspended columnist
Mike Barnicle for using a comedian's jokes without attribution and for allegedly making up a story about two young cancer survivors. The Globe also asked for the resignation of Patricia Smith for fabricating characters and quotations in her articles. 61 " That is not so much because editors and publishers fear defamation claims as much as they are concerned about losing their public's trust. 62 Unlike money managers or government agents, whatever the newspaper publishes is immediately examined by a widespread readership. Mistakes are quickly noted and reported. And true disclosure is the lifeblood of the publication. The incentives of the media are aligned with true information and consequent enforcement aimed at reputation.
Disadvantages
However, these strengths and incentives may have disadvantages. What if management buys or controls a newspaper? The answer is that so long as there are different views expressed in different media people can get a balanced view. "The market for true information" might work in such cases.
What if the Court of Public Opinion is a flawed decision-maker?
Compare judging corporate management's duty of care with criminal cases. Public policy in the United States prohibits the Court of Public Opinion from intervention or influence in such cases. The danger of unfair justice and the magnitude of the consequences to the accused require another rule. In federal criminal procedure, the rule that governs transfer of the hearing for prejudice 63 "is intended for cases in which prejudice in the community will make it difficult or impossible to select a fair and impartial jury." 64 73 For our purpose and in our context, however, the Court has listened to the testimony and arguments, and its decision does not create a threat without a basis.
Nonetheless, there are those who argue that bringing the case before the judicial court or trial by publicity requires a balance, as William Scott Croft has suggested. 74 The Disney situation is not unique. Although the relationship between the CEO and the board of directors has been recently changing, there are many corporations in which the board does not exercise strong supervision over the CEO. There are some "imperial CEOs" around, and there are others that collect enormous compensations. 75 In these situations it may well be that courts should not interfere and that the Court of Public
Opinion would be a more appropriate judge. Let the public determine how much management should collect in compensation and whether management has behaved properly; the final word could remain with the Courts of Law. They decide whether to interfere in the boards' decisions and whether to express their opinion about the management's behavior. Courts of Law can reduce legal enforcement costs and offer another powerful and effective form of enforcement through the media. 76 What if the relationships and behavior of the management are seriously flawed but do not have the drawing interest that other cases do, such as "Disney?" The answer is that the media need not cover all cases. Media is suitable for some cases, especially when they are of interest to the public. These include mainly the powerful corporations and their boards and management. These are the cases in which the additional support of the media is most effective and desirable.
What if the media becomes the unfair prosecutor of management? The answer is that in such a case the corporate board is free to resist following the media's judgment. The board has and can seek to tell its story. The media usually invites management to tell its side of the story. Ken Lay went to the newspapers, even in the shadow of criminal prosecution. 77 H-P management was invited to do the same and took advantage of the invitation. 78 In fact, the management member who has been charged is terminally ill. She emphasized her desire to clear her name and reputation. She did not seem to care about the criminal charges against her but aimed at reestablishing her good reputation in the Court of Public Opinion.
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The Judge's use of obiter dicta should be considered. Is it fair for a judge to berate the parties or witnesses in part of the decision that is not subject to appeal? Is the judge protected from berating the witnesses or the parties in obiter dicta? The judge is protected from any civil liability. In 1872, the Supreme Court held that, unless judicial acts are done in clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction, "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." 80 However, a judge who makes public statements outside the courtroom and judicial proceedings may be subject to an action for defamation. 81 Judges have rarely been disciplined under the Code of Judicial Conduct, for negative statements about a litigant in a judicial opinion. 82 However, there are few cases that disciplined judges for negative verbal statements in conjunction with judicial proceedings, 83 and for public statements outside the courtroom. 84 In In re Rome 85 a judge had filed a "Memorandum Decision" for a proceeding in which a woman found guilty of prostitution was placed on probation. The opinion was written in poetic form and intended to be humorous. It led to widespread publicity and a complaint from a feminist group that the defendant "had been held up to public ridicule." 86 The court held that while "a judge is not subject to discipline for exercising his discretion in performing a judicial act." 87 Judges are prohibited "from the use of humor at the expense of the litigants before them" and "should not 'wisecrack' at the expense of anyone connected with a judicial proceeding who is not in a position to reply" 88 and censured the judge.
To what extent may judges use decisions to express their opinions in obiter dicta?
"Obiter dictum" (or "dictum") has been defined as "A judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered persuasive." 90 An argument could be made that judges should avoid dicta. 91 There is a reciprocal relationship between them and each affects the other. Courts have been accused of being an unelected governing body. 92 The relationships between the Court of Law and the Court of Public Opinion can reduce the severity of this criticism.
Disney Court indirectly spoke to, and accommodated, the media but was also affected by the information and judgment of the media. This is especially important in relation to corporate governance that does not amount to clear violation of the law. 94 it did offer unusual advice to corporate management in obiter dictum. In addition, it has provided proven material for publication. In this respect it has broken new ground. We will never know whether this approach is better than the one we have had until now, because we cannot turn the clock back to experiment. It may well be that the most brilliant corporate managers will flee the Court of Public Opinion to manage non-public corporations, or escape abroad to manage non-U.S. corporations.
It may well be that the results of such flight will be that the United States will fall behind other countries that offer more shelter to their corporate managers. Whether non-public corporations and foreign countries offer these managers better terms and freedom remains to be seen. The shareholders of non-public corporations may exercise far more control over the corporate managers. Foreign governments may do the same by law or rules or informally.
In the United States, in the area of corporate governance of public corporations, the courts of law and the courts of public opinion may complement each other to produce greater, more flexible, and more effective ways to ensure the accountability of those who control very large and powerful public corporations.
